Diplomatic Interactions

Diplomatic Interactions

Diplomacy of Extraregional Powers and the Reproduction of Geopolitical Insecurity in the Mediterranean Sea

Document Type : Original Article

Authors
Assistant Professor, Department of International Relations, Faculty of Literature and Humanities, University of Guilan, Rasht, Iran.
10.22034/dpiq.2026.580311.1083
Abstract
Introduction
The Eastern Mediterranean has become one of the most complex geopolitical environments in the contemporary international system. Over the past decade, the region has experienced growing competition among extraregional powers, regional states, and transnational economic actors. Geopolitical disputes, competition over energy resources, military deployments, infrastructure projects, maritime boundary disagreements, and competing diplomatic initiatives have interacted with one another and contributed to the formation of a fragile, multilayered security environment. In this context, the Eastern Mediterranean is not merely a regional arena in which local actors pursue their interests; rather, it has increasingly become a space in which extraregional powers seek to expand their strategic, economic, military, and diplomatic influence. The growing presence of China, Russia, the United States, and European powers has added new dimensions to the region's geopolitical dynamics. China has expanded its economic and infrastructural presence through trade, investment, transportation networks, and port-related projects. Russia has combined diplomatic engagement with military presence and security partnerships, particularly in relation to the Syrian crisis and the wider Eastern Mediterranean. The United States has maintained its transatlantic strategic presence through diplomatic, military, and security arrangements with regional partners. European states have also sought to strengthen their influence in the region, although differences among France, Germany, and Italy have sometimes produced divergent strategic approaches. Against this background, diplomacy cannot be understood solely as an instrument for resolving conflicts and reducing insecurity. It may simultaneously function as an instrument of geopolitical competition through which states seek to consolidate alliances, modify regional balances of power, secure economic interests, and strengthen their strategic positions. Consequently, diplomatic interaction may contribute to the management of conflicts while, under particular circumstances, reproducing the structural conditions that generate geopolitical insecurity.
Research Objective
The main objective of this study is to explain the role of extraregional powers' diplomacy in the reproduction of geopolitical insecurity in the Mediterranean, with particular emphasis on the Eastern Mediterranean. The study examines how diplomatic practices interact with military interventions, geopolitical competition, geoeconomic interests, energy competition, and infrastructure investments. The central research question is: What role does the diplomacy of extraregional powers, in interaction with their military and geoeconomic interventions, play in reproducing geopolitical insecurity in the Mediterranean, and through what mechanisms does it affect regional security dynamics? The study argues that diplomacy, when embedded in overlapping geopolitical and geoeconomic interests and in structural competition among extraregional powers, does not necessarily reduce insecurity. Instead, through selective coalition-building, the transformation of regional power relations, the securitization of strategic interests, and the intensification of regional competition, diplomatic practices may contribute to the reproduction of geopolitical insecurity. Accordingly, the study focuses on the interaction among diplomacy, geopolitics, geoeconomics, energy security, military presence, and regional alliances.
Methodology
This research employs a qualitative approach and an explanatory research method. Data were collected through library research and documentary sources, including academic literature, official documents, policy statements, institutional reports, and other relevant materials. The analytical framework is based on geoplenomics, which offers a perspective for examining the interaction between geopolitical and geoeconomic processes and its consequences for regional and international power relations. Within this framework, the behavior of the principal extraregional powers is examined comparatively in order to identify the mechanisms through which diplomatic, economic, military, and infrastructural instruments interact. China, Russia, the United States, and European powers constitute the principal cases of analysis. The comparison does not seek to establish a hierarchical ranking among these actors; rather, it identifies differences in the instruments and mechanisms through which each actor contributes to the transformation of the Mediterranean security environment. The study therefore conceptualizes geopolitical insecurity as the outcome of interacting processes rather than as the direct consequence of a single conflict or actor. Particular attention is paid to the relationship among diplomatic initiatives, military presence, energy competition, infrastructure projects, strategic partnerships, and exclusive or selective regional coalitions.
Findings
The findings indicate that the diplomacy of extraregional powers has become closely interconnected with broader geopolitical and geoeconomic competition in the Mediterranean. Rather than operating independently of military and economic instruments, diplomacy frequently functions alongside them and contributes to the restructuring of regional relationships.
China has pursued a form of economic diplomacy in which trade, investment, infrastructure, transportation networks, and strategic economic connectivity are interconnected. This approach has strengthened China's economic presence in the Mediterranean and linked its economic interests with broader geoeconomic competition. Infrastructure and investment therefore acquire strategic significance beyond their immediate economic functions.
Russia has followed a different pattern by combining diplomacy with military presence and security instruments. Its involvement in the Syrian conflict and its broader engagement with Mediterranean actors have enabled Moscow to connect diplomatic initiatives with military and strategic capabilities. This combination has increased Russia's capacity to influence regional security calculations and has contributed to the transformation of the regional balance of power.
The United States has continued to rely on its transatlantic strategic position and a combination of diplomatic, military, and security instruments. Its relations with regional allies and partners, its military presence, and its security arrangements have contributed to the formation of specific strategic alignments. These arrangements can strengthen deterrence and security cooperation among participating states while simultaneously contributing to competitive dynamics among other regional and extraregional actors.
European powers have also played a significant role, although their approaches have not always converged. France, Germany, and Italy have pursued partially different priorities regarding energy, migration, security, economic relations, and relations with regional actors. Such strategic divergence has limited the emergence of a fully coherent European approach to the Mediterranean security environment.
The findings further demonstrate that energy competition is an important link between geopolitics and geoeconomics in the Eastern Mediterranean. Competition over energy resources and transportation routes has interacted with maritime disputes, strategic partnerships, infrastructure development, and military deployments. Consequently, energy security has become intertwined with broader questions of territorial claims, regional alliances, and geopolitical influence.
Another finding concerns the role of selective coalitions. Diplomatic cooperation among particular states may improve coordination and security among participating actors; however, when such arrangements exclude competing actors or become embedded in broader geopolitical rivalries, they can contribute to the reproduction of insecurity. In this sense, diplomacy may simultaneously perform two functions: conflict management and competitive power projection.
Conclusion
The study concludes that geopolitical insecurity in the Eastern Mediterranean cannot be adequately explained by local disputes or military confrontation alone. It is also shaped by the interaction of extraregional diplomacy with geopolitical and geoeconomic competition. The diplomacy of China, Russia, the United States, and European powers operates within different strategic frameworks, but their activities collectively contribute to the complexity of the regional security environment. From the perspective of geoplenomics, the interaction among economic connectivity, infrastructure, energy resources, military capabilities, diplomatic initiatives, and strategic alliances has transformed the Mediterranean into a multidimensional arena of competition. Diplomacy in such an environment does not necessarily function as a mechanism for eliminating conflict. Instead, when diplomatic initiatives are closely connected to geopolitical and geoeconomic competition, they may contribute to the management of conflicts without eliminating their underlying sources and, under certain conditions, may reproduce geopolitical insecurity. The Eastern Mediterranean can consequently be understood as a densely interconnected insecurity complex, in which crises and rivalries can spill over across issue areas and geographical boundaries. Energy competition may become connected to maritime disputes; military deployments may affect diplomatic alignments; infrastructure projects may acquire geopolitical significance; and selective alliances may influence regional balances of power. These interactions create a fragile equilibrium in which the absence of an inclusive framework for regional cooperation and of effective mechanisms for conflict resolution allows competitive dynamics to persist. Reducing geopolitical insecurity in the Eastern Mediterranean therefore requires attention not only to individual disputes but also to the interconnected geopolitical and geoeconomic structures within which those disputes unfold. An inclusive regional framework capable of incorporating the interests of regional and extraregional actors, together with effective diplomatic mechanisms for managing maritime, energy, security, and economic disputes, would provide a basis for limiting the reproduction of insecurity. The central implication of the study is that diplomacy should be examined not only as an instrument of conflict resolution but also as an element of broader geopolitical and geoeconomic competition that can reshape regional security dynamics.
Keywords
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