## 1. Extended Abstract

### 1. Introduction

Over the past decade, the Mediterranean Sea has transformed from a historically significant maritime space into a central arena for intensifying rivalries among extra-regional powers. Military interventions, infrastructural investments, and competition over energy resources have rendered the region’s security order increasingly fragile and unstable. This study addresses a critical gap in the existing literature by examining how such interventions systematically reproduce, rather than mitigate, geopolitical insecurity. Unlike prior research that treats economic, security, and geopolitical dimensions separately, this paper adopts an integrated geopolinomic framework. The central premise is that the overlapping geopolitical and geoeconomic interests of extra-regional actors—combined with their structural rivalries—complicate regional power equations, deepen existing conflicts, and generate cascading insecurity across the Eastern Mediterranean. The region has thus become a “dense insecurity complex,” where crisis spillovers, militarization, and exclusive coalitions lock the regional order into a precarious and volatile equilibrium.

### 2. Research Questions


What role do extra-regional power interventions play in the reproduction of geopolitical insecurity in the Mediterranean Sea, and through which mechanisms do these interventions affect regional security dynamics?

1. What linkages exist between the geopolitical and geoeconomic interests of extra-regional powers in the Mediterranean?

These questions are answered through a hypothesis-driven design: extra-regional interventions—due to overlapping interests and structural competition—do not reduce insecurity but instead reproduce it by complicating power dynamics and escalating regional rivalries.

### 3. Literature Review

The existing literature is divided into three broad streams. The first focuses on maritime transport disruptions in the Mediterranean and their short-term economic consequences, such as rising shipping costs and global supply chain shocks. However, these studies lack long-term security-economy linkage analysis and neglect adaptive strategies of states and shipping firms. The second stream, rooted in trade geography, examines the role of transport infrastructure and shipping routes in shaping international trade patterns. While highlighting cost factors and route shifts (e.g., from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea or Aegean), these studies overlook the heterogeneous spatial-strategic consequences across different regions and industries. The third stream analyzes maritime security, naval force competition, and extra-regional presence, offering accurate security dynamics but failing to integrate economic and security dimensions simultaneously. More comprehensive studies address great power rivalries and emerging security challenges but pay limited attention to specific maritime threats (piracy, smuggling, non-state actors) and socio-environmental consequences. Overall, the literature remains fragmented. The present study’s innovation lies in its unified geopolinomic analysis, which synthesizes geopolitical, geoeconomic, and geographic components to explain the extra-regional competition pattern in the Mediterranean.

### 4. Methodology

This research adopts a **qualitative approach** and employs a **descriptive-analytical method**. Data collection is based on **library and documentary sources**, including peer-reviewed articles, policy papers, official strategy documents (e.g., Russia’s 2022 Maritime Doctrine, US Sixth Fleet posture, EU’s New Pact for the Mediterranean 2025), and recognized geopolitical databases. The **theoretical framework** is **geopolinomics**—an integration of geopolitics and geoeconomics. The study operationalizes Mesbahi’s two-level, two-domain threat-opportunity system (domestic, regional, international levels; geopolitical and geoeconomic domains). Geopolinomics, as defined by Demko and Woods (1994), is an informal regime governing economic relations and regional cooperation while simultaneously respecting geopolitical concerns. This framework allows the analysis of transport corridors, energy routes, and trade relations without ignoring security anxieties among rivals. The study also employs a **comparative analysis approach** to examine behavioral patterns of China, Russia, the United States, and European actors (France, Germany, Italy) in the Eastern Mediterranean.

### 5. Results

The findings reveal four distinct yet overlapping intervention logics:

- **China:** Following a multi-node logistics strategy under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China invests in key ports (Piraeus, Haifa, Ashdod, Valencia, Zeebrugge, Vado Ligure). The Mediterranean attracts ~10% of total BRI investments (2013–2021), concentrated in transport/logistics (30%) and energy (24%). Through gradual acquisition of Piraeus (COSCO) and development of rail links (Hungary-Serbia railway, Pan-European Corridor), China reduces dependence on limited routes while creating “relational power” nodes. Although primarily geoeconomic, China’s growing naval presence and evacuation operations in Libya signal a gradual securitization of economic assets.

- **Russia:** Anchored in the 2022 Maritime Doctrine, Russia classifies the Eastern Mediterranean as a “important” strategic priority. It has constructed Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) bubbles (S-300, S-400, Bastion-P systems) in Syria, upgraded Tartus to a permanent base, and intervened in Libya (supporting Haftar). The “distributed force” approach (Kalibr cruise missiles on smaller vessels) offsets limited heavy fleet capabilities. Russia’s “competitive-cooperative” network with Turkey (selective interdependence, S-400 deal), Israel (limited tactical coordination), Egypt (joint drills), and South Cyprus provides logistical flexibility but remains constrained by technological weaknesses, sanctions, and underdeveloped economic depth.

- **United States:** The US faces a fundamental paradox. While seeking reduced direct military presence and burden-sharing with NATO allies, its relative disengagement has created opportunity spaces for Russia and China. The Sixth Fleet and carrier strike groups remain central, but US strategy now relies on “transatlantic presence” and enabling regional allies (East Med Gas Forum: Israel, Egypt, Greece, Cyprus). Washington supports Israeli offshore gas (Chevron) to diversify European supply away from Russia. However, declining ally trust (post-Arab Spring), enhanced Russian A2/AD capabilities, and European energy diversification pressures challenge long-term US commitment. The Trump administration’s proactive but high-risk posture remains uncertain.

- **Europe:** The EU exhibits **strategic divergence**. France adopts an interventionist approach (military and diplomatic) to counter Turkey in Libya and support Greece/Cyprus, but this undermines internal EU consensus. Germany pursues pragmatic mediation (Berlin Process on Libya), seeking “minimal stability” through dialogue, rooted in structural interdependencies with Turkey but lacking hard-power backing. Italy balances between North African (Libyan energy dependence) and Eastern Mediterranean interests (Cyprus, Egypt projects), resulting in ambiguous “balancing” that limits strategic influence. The New Pact for the Mediterranean (2025) remains largely discursive rather than operationally cohesive.

### 6. Discussion

The results confirm the hypothesis: extra-regional interventions reproduce insecurity not because of presence per se, but because of their **competitive and overlapping character**. The absence of a trusted, comprehensive cooperation framework means every new energy discovery, port investment, or military deployment intensifies rivalries rather than fostering convergence. The Eastern Mediterranean has become a “**dense insecurity complex**” characterized by three mechanisms:
(1) **Crisis spillover** (Libya to Gaza, Syria to Cyprus) intertwining threats;
(2) **Militarization** (A2/AD bubbles, carrier deployments, naval exercises) raising escalation risks;
3) **Exclusive coalitions** (East Med Gas Forum, Russia-Turkey selective cooperation, US-Greece-Cyprus axis) that exclude key actors and deepen zero-sum perceptions. Energy resources function not as cooperation catalysts but as leverage tools. The lack of a stabilizing hegemon and weakened conflict-resolution mechanisms further entrench this insecurity trap.

### 7. Conclusion

The Mediterranean has become an arena for a new **Great Game**, where insecurity costs are disproportionately borne by fragile littoral states. The study concludes that insecurity reproduction is rooted in the competitive structure of extra-regional interventions. Until great and regional powers agree on basic cooperation principles—maritime boundary delimitation, equitable energy benefit-sharing, and respect for coastal state sovereignty—the region will remain trapped. The New Pact for the Mediterranean, despite its ambitious language, will likely follow previous initiatives unless backed by collective political will and robust enforcement mechanisms. Sustainable security requires recognizing mutual interests, building inclusive regional institutions, and decoupling energy benefits from geopolitical rivalries—a reality extra-regional and regional actors have so far refused to accept.