Problem Statement and Background
In recent decades, the growing complexity of international relations and the rise of non‑state actors have transformed diplomacy from a state‑centric enterprise into a multi‑layered process involving various knowledge‑producing institutions. Within this transformed diplomatic landscape, think tanks have emerged as significant intermediaries between specialized knowledge and policy decisions, particularly in foreign policy and diplomatic negotiations. While the literature acknowledges their growing influence on policymaking (Abelson, 2018; McGann, 2020), there remains a notable gap in comparative institutional analysis of how these organizations exert influence specifically on diplomatic processes and negotiations—often termed "Track II diplomacy" (Jones, 2015). This gap is especially pronounced when comparing Western and non‑Western contexts, where institutional arrangements differ fundamentally.
Existing scholarship largely focuses on Western democracies, especially the United States, where think tanks like Brookings and Carnegie have long shaped foreign policy discourse and provided direct input to negotiating teams (Rich, 2004; Stone, 2007). However, far less attention has been paid to institutional conditions that enable or constrain think tank influence on diplomacy in non‑Western contexts, such as Iran. While a few studies have examined Iranian think tanks in terms of structure, funding, or general policy impact (Fattahi et al., 2019; Pour Ramezan & Mohammadi, 2025; Sadeghi Ghahroudi, 2024), none offers a systematic comparative analysis of how institutional arrangements affect their actual diplomatic influence. This study addresses that gap by asking: How do institutional differences between selected American and Iranian think tanks lead to divergent levels of influence on diplomatic processes and foreign policy outcomes? Specifically, it investigates why Brookings and Carnegie shape international negotiations and diplomatic agendas, while their Iranian counterparts—despite academic capacity or official status—remain largely peripheral to actual diplomatic decision‑making. The study is grounded in new institutionalism, which emphasizes formal rules, informal norms, and historical path dependence, and also draws on Track II diplomacy as a key mechanism for think tank influence.
Research Objective
The primary objective is to conduct a comparative institutionalist analysis of four think tanks—two American (Brookings and Carnegie) and two Iranian (Sharif Governance Think Tank and IPIS). The study aims to: (1) identify and compare institutional structures, funding mechanisms, and networking strategies; (2) assess levels of access to diplomatic processes and negotiation teams; (3) evaluate actual influence on diplomatic discourse, negotiation agendas, and foreign policy outcomes; and (4) explain institutional factors accounting for observed differences. Ultimately, it seeks actionable policy recommendations for enhancing Iranian think tanks' diplomatic influence, grounded in new institutionalism. The study also contributes to the broader literature on think tank influence by highlighting how institutional design shapes the capacity of these organizations to participate effectively in diplomatic processes.
Research Methodology
This study adopts a qualitative comparative case study design, drawing on new institutionalism—an approach emphasizing formal rules, informal norms, institutional structures, and historical path dependence in shaping political actors' behaviour (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Peters, 2012). This framework explains why similar organizations perform differently across institutional environments. The four think tanks were purposively selected based on three criteria: (a) relevance to foreign policy and diplomacy, (b) institutional diversity (independent to state‑embedded), and (c) sufficient documentary evidence. Data were collected through extensive document analysis of official reports, financial statements, organizational statutes, research outputs, and media appearances. Additionally, process tracing tracked specific instances of influence on diplomatic negotiations and policy decisions, using secondary sources and public records. The analysis was structured around three dimensions: (1) institutional structure and independence (financial autonomy, governance, staffing), (2) networking and access to diplomatic bodies, and (3) actual influence on diplomatic processes (direct, indirect, and discursive). This triangulation ensures reliability and allows for a nuanced understanding of how institutionalism can explain divergent patterns of diplomatic influence.
Findings
The findings reveal a stark contrast between the two national contexts. American think tanks (Brookings and Carnegie) exhibit high institutional independence, diverse sustainable funding, and extensive networking with the U.S. diplomatic corps. Brookings, founded in 1916, benefits from a large endowment (over US$466 million in 2025) and a well‑established "revolving door" whereby researchers frequently move between the think tank and senior diplomatic positions. This allows Brookings scholars direct participation in advisory meetings, informal dialogues, and working groups for international negotiations. Its research outputs—hundreds of reports annually—are routinely cited by U.S. negotiators and shape acceptable diplomatic discourse. Carnegie, established in 1910, adopts a transnational approach with regional offices worldwide. Its focus on strategic issues such as arms control and great power politics gives it a unique ability to shape global diplomatic norms and facilitate multilateral negotiations. Carnegie's experts are frequently invited to UN consultations and Track II dialogue sessions, contributing to pre‑negotiation frameworks. Both institutions exercise influence through direct policy advice, agenda‑setting, and normative framing—termed "discursive influence."
Iranian think tanks (Sharif and IPIS) face significant constraints. Sharif enjoys relative academic independence and produces high‑quality research on governance, but lacks institutionalized communication channels with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its influence remains indirect and expert‑level, confined to occasional workshops and personal contacts, with no systematic mechanism for translating research into diplomatic products. IPIS, directly attached to the Ministry, has formal access to classified information and negotiating teams, giving it direct influence on intra‑organizational decision‑making. Yet its dependence on state bureaucracy limits analytical independence, originality, and capacity for constructive criticism. Its influence is largely supportive of official positions, and confidentiality prevents its outputs from contributing to broader diplomatic discourse. These findings demonstrate that institutionalism explains why think tanks with similar academic capacities have vastly different levels of diplomatic influence, highlighting a structural dilemma for Iran: Sharif has independence but no access, while IPIS has access but no independence.
Conclusion
The comparative analysis demonstrates that think tanks' diplomatic influence is shaped by three institutional factors: (1) organizational independence, (2) systematic access to diplomatic processes, and (3) effective participation in Track II diplomacy. American think tanks succeed by combining high independence with informal yet institutionalized access, enabling them to shape both negotiation content and broader intellectual frameworks. Iranian think tanks suffer from a structural dilemma—Sharif has independence but no access, while IPIS has access but no independence—and neither achieves the synergy required for substantial influence. The study concludes that without reforming institutional frameworks and creating intermediary links between think tanks and the diplomatic structure, expectations of increasing think tank influence on Iran's foreign policy are unrealistic. Based on the institutionalist perspective, four policy recommendations are offered: (1) enhancing independence through diverse sustainable funding; (2) establishing systematic channels for interaction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; (3) strengthening Track II diplomacy through informal dialogues; and (4) translating academic outputs into diplomatic products. These recommendations, rooted in new institutionalism, provide a roadmap for bridging the gap between knowledge production and diplomatic influence in Iran's foreign policy system, highlighting that institutional design is a critical variable in explaining cross‑national variation in think tank influence.