تعاملات دیپلماتیک

تعاملات دیپلماتیک

محرک‌های عادی‌سازی رابطه امارات متحده عربی و رژیم صهیونیستی از منظر دیپلماسی پنهان

نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی

نویسندگان
گروه مطالعات منطقه‌ای، دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی، دانشگاه تهران، تهران، ایران.
10.22034/dpiq.2026.599619.1106
چکیده
عادی‌سازی روابط امارات متحده عربی و رژیم صهیونیستی در قالب پیمان ابراهیم، اگرچه در سال ۲۰۲۰ رسمیت یافت، حاصل تصمیمی ناگهانی نبود و ریشه در روندی تدریجی از تعاملات پنهان و نیمه‌رسمی داشت. با وجود توجه پژوهش‌های پیشین به عوامل امنیتی، اقتصادی و ژئوپلیتیکی، نقش دیپلماسی پنهان در گذار این روابط از تقابل رسمی به همکاری آشکار، کمتر به‌صورت یکپارچه بررسی شده است. پژوهش حاضر با هدف تبیین چگونگی شکل‌گیری و تثبیت روابط دو طرف و شناسایی محرک‌ها و پیامدهای راهبردی آن انجام شده است. این پژوهش با رویکرد کیفی و روش توصیفی-تحلیلی انجام گرفته و داده‌های آن به شیوه اسنادی و کتابخانه‌ای، از طریق بررسی کتاب‌ها، مقالات علمی، گزارش‌های رسمی، اسناد منتشرشده و منابع رسانه‌ای گردآوری و بر اساس چارچوب مفهومی دیپلماسی پنهان تحلیل شده‌اند. یافته‌ها نشان می‌دهد همکاری‌های امنیتی و اطلاعاتی، ادراک تهدید مشترک از ایران، نیاز امارات به فناوری‌های پیشرفته و تنوع‌بخشی اقتصادی، تغییر نسلی در ساختار رهبری این کشور و بهره‌گیری از رویدادهای بین‌المللی، ورزشی و رسانه‌ای، مهم‌ترین عوامل زمینه‌ساز عادی‌سازی بوده‌اند. این تعاملات ابتدا از طریق کانال‌های محرمانه و شرکت‌های واسطه شکل گرفتند و سپس با کاهش تدریجی حساسیت‌ها، به روابط نیمه علنی انتقال یافتند. در مجموع، پیمان ابراهیم را نمی‌توان نقطه آغاز روابط دو طرف دانست، بلکه این پیمان مرحله نهایی فرایندی بلندمدت از اعتمادسازی و همگرایی منافع بود. این روند برای امارات دسترسی به ظرفیت‌های فناورانه و برای رژیم صهیونیستی نفوذ ژئوپلیتیکی و اقتصادی گسترده‌تر در خلیج‌فارس را فراهم کرد و الگویی از گذار مدیریت‌شده از روابط پنهان به همکاری رسمی ارائه داد.
کلیدواژه‌ها
موضوعات

عنوان مقاله English

Drivers of the Normalization of Relations between the United Arab Emirates and Israel: A Perspective on Covert Diplomacy

نویسندگان English

AMIR FALLAHI
Seyed Hamzeh Safavi
Department of Regional Studies, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran, Tehran, Iran.
چکیده English

Introduction
The normalization of relations between the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Israel, formally announced in 2020 under the framework of the Abraham Accords, marked one of the most significant transformations in the contemporary political order of the Middle East. Although the agreement was publicly presented as a new diplomatic initiative, available evidence suggests that it was preceded by an extended process of covert, informal, and semi-official interactions between the two sides. For years, the absence of formal diplomatic relations did not prevent Emirati and Israeli officials, security institutions, private companies, and intermediaries from establishing limited channels of communication and cooperation. These contacts gradually expanded beyond security and intelligence matters to encompass economic, technological, diplomatic, sporting, and media-related activities.
Previous studies have primarily explained the normalization agreement in terms of security threats, economic interests, geopolitical transformations, and shifts in the regional policies of Arab states. However, the role of covert diplomacy in preparing the political and social conditions necessary for the transition from official confrontation to open cooperation has received comparatively limited and fragmented attention. Accordingly, the central problem addressed in this study concerns how covert diplomacy facilitated the gradual emergence, expansion, and eventual formalization of relations between the UAE and Israel, and how the respective interests and strategic calculations of the two parties contributed to this process.
Objective

This study aims to explain the evolution of Emirati–Israeli relations prior to the formal announcement of the Abraham Accords and to identify the principal factors that encouraged the UAE and Israel to move from covert contacts to overt diplomatic relations. It also seeks to clarify the functions of covert diplomacy in reducing political sensitivities, managing the domestic and regional costs of cooperation, building mutual confidence, and assessing the feasibility of establishing formal relations. By examining the interaction among security, economic, political, and technological considerations, the study seeks to provide an integrated explanation of the normalization process and its broader strategic implications for both parties and the regional order of the Persian Gulf.
Method
This research adopts a qualitative approach and employs a descriptive–analytical method. Data were collected through documentary and library-based research, drawing on academic books and articles, official statements and published documents, analytical reports, and credible media sources addressing the development of relations between the UAE and Israel. The collected materials were examined within the conceptual framework of covert diplomacy. This framework provides an analytical basis for investigating communications and negotiations conducted outside conventional and publicly acknowledged diplomatic channels, particularly in contexts where formal relations are either absent or politically costly. The evidence was organized thematically around the major dimensions of the bilateral relationship, including security and intelligence cooperation, perceptions of regional threats, economic and technological interests, leadership change, and the use of international, sporting, and media events. The analysis also differentiates among the covert, semi-public, and official stages of the relationship to explain how limited and deniable interactions gradually evolved into institutionalized diplomatic cooperation. Rather than treating the Abraham Accords as an isolated event, this study examines the agreement as the culmination of a longer historical and political process.
Findings
The findings demonstrate that the normalization of relations between the UAE and Israel resulted from the convergence of several interconnected factors rather than from a single diplomatic decision. Security and intelligence cooperation constituted one of the earliest and most influential foundations of the bilateral relationship. A shared perception of regional threats, particularly the growing regional influence of Iran and concerns regarding its political, military, and nuclear capabilities, created incentives for communication and coordination. Covert channels enabled the two parties to exchange information, identify areas of common interest, and develop practical forms of cooperation without immediately incurring the political costs associated with formal diplomatic relations.
Economic and technological considerations also played a decisive role in advancing the relationship. The UAE's strategy of economic diversification and its efforts to reduce dependence on oil strengthened its interest in advanced technologies, cybersecurity, surveillance systems, water management, agriculture, healthcare, renewable energy, and knowledge-based industries. Israel possessed considerable capabilities in many of these fields and viewed cooperation with the UAE as an opportunity to gain access to an influential Arab market and expand its economic and technological presence in the Persian Gulf. Consequently, private companies, commercial intermediaries, and unofficial networks served as important channels for establishing initial contacts and translating shared interests into practical cooperation.
The findings further indicate that generational change within the UAE's leadership contributed to the emergence of a more pragmatic foreign policy orientation. The new leadership increasingly assessed relations with Israel through the prism of national interests, regional influence, security requirements, and economic modernization. Within this approach, the Palestinian issue retained its political significance but no longer represented an absolute obstacle to cooperation. This shift enabled Emirati decision-makers to distinguish their bilateral strategic interests from the traditional position that normalization should take place only following a comprehensive resolution of the Palestinian question.
International conferences, multilateral institutions, sporting competitions, cultural activities, and media interactions also contributed to the gradual public visibility of the relationship. These events provided controlled settings in which officials and representatives of both sides could interact without immediately establishing full diplomatic relations. Such encounters helped reduce the symbolic sensitivity surrounding Israeli participation in the UAE and prepared regional and international audiences for a potential shift in bilateral relations. Covert diplomacy thus functioned not merely as a means of secret communication but also as a flexible mechanism for managing the transition from denial to limited acknowledgment and, ultimately, formal recognition.
The development of the relationship can be divided into three broadly distinguishable stages. During the first stage, contacts remained highly confidential and focused primarily on security, intelligence, and strategically sensitive matters. In the second stage, cooperation acquired a semi-public character through commercial relations, international meetings, technological exchanges, sporting events, and limited official encounters. In the final stage, the accumulated experience of cooperation, the convergence of strategic interests, and the gradual reduction of political sensitivities created the conditions necessary for formal normalization. The Abraham Accords, therefore, institutionalized a relationship that had already been developing rather than establishing one from the outset.
Conclusion
The study concludes that covert diplomacy played a central role in the formation and consolidation of relations between the UAE and Israel. It enabled both parties to identify shared interests, assess the reliability of one another, mitigate political risks, and gradually expand cooperation while the establishment of formal diplomatic relations remained politically sensitive. The Abraham Accords should therefore be understood as the culmination of a long-term process of confidence-building and strategic convergence rather than as the sudden beginning of bilateral relations.

Normalization provided the UAE with broader access to Israeli security, intelligence, and technological capabilities while supporting its ambitions for economic diversification and enhanced regional influence. For Israel, the agreement created opportunities to expand its geopolitical, diplomatic, and economic presence in the Persian Gulf and reduce its regional isolation. At the regional level, this development demonstrated how changes in threat perceptions, leadership priorities, and national interests could transform established patterns of Arab–Israeli relations. The case also illustrates how covert diplomacy can lay the groundwork for formal agreements by managing opposition, reducing uncertainty, and gradually legitimizing forms of cooperation that were previously considered unacceptable. Nevertheless, the sustainability and regional legitimacy of these relations remain closely linked to broader developments in the Middle East, particularly the persistence of the Palestinian question and shifts in the regional balance of power.

کلیدواژه‌ها English

Abraham Accords
Covert Diplomacy
Israel
Normalization
Strategic Cooperation
United Arab Emirates.
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    Translated References into English

    ·         Abbaszadeh Fathabadi, M. & Khosravi, M. (2025). Future Studies of the Regional Security Order in West Asia in the Diplomatic Context after the Abraham Accords: A Study Based on Peter Schwartz's Method. Diplomatic Interactions, 3(10), 117–176. https://doi.org/10.22034/dpiq.2025.545627.1051.

    ·   Sarkheil, B. (2025). Reconfiguring Diplomatic Interactions between Iran and the UAE: From Complementary Cooperation to Tense Competitive Coexistence. Diplomatic Interactions, 3(11), 83–118. https://doi.org/10.22034/dpiq.2026.560628.1062