This article, derived from the dissertation entitled “The Impact of the Cognitive System of Iranian Elites on the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Approach to the Political Economy of the Middle East (2005–2024),” comparatively examines the role of the cognitive system of political elites in the continuity and change of Iran’s regional diplomacy during the administrations of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Hassan Rouhani, and Ebrahim Raisi. The central question is whether variations in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s regional policies have resulted solely from changes in structural conditions and external pressures, or whether the cognitive system of elites, as an independent variable, has played a determining role in these transformations.

To address this question, the study employs a theoretical framework combining four cognition-oriented theories: Axelrod’s cognitive maps, George’s operational codes, Miskimmon’s strategic narratives, and Sabatier’s advocacy coalitions. Adopting a qualitative approach and thematic analysis, including open, axial, and selective coding, the study reconstructs the cognitive systems of elites across the three periods and examines their correspondence with observable government behavior in the areas of regionalism and neighborhood policy.

The findings indicate that during the Ahmadinejad administration, the perception of the international environment as a hegemonic order contributed to the formation of a narrative centered on “independence and resistance” and an operational code emphasizing self-reliance. During the Rouhani administration, the perception of the costs of confrontation led to a narrative of “constructive engagement” and operational codes centered on negotiation and multilateralism. During the Raisi administration, the simultaneous perception of threats and opportunities resulted in a narrative of “independence accompanied by network-building” and a combination of operational codes focused on pressure neutralization and neighborhood policy.

Despite these differences, elements of continuity, including independence, security, and national interests, remained common across all three periods. The findings support all four hypotheses of the study, albeit with critical qualifications. In particular, they indicate that the boundaries between competing cognitive coalitions are more permeable in practice than is reflected in the overall synthesis, while the relationship between elite cognition and policy change demonstrates correlation rather than necessarily establishing causality.
This article, derived from the dissertation entitled “The Impact of the Cognitive System of Iranian Elites on the Islamic Republic of Iran’s Approach to the Political Economy of the Middle East (2005–2024),” comparatively examines the role of the cognitive system of political elites in the continuity and change of Iran’s regional diplomacy during the administrations of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Hassan Rouhani, and Ebrahim Raisi. The central question is whether variations in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s regional policies have resulted solely from changes in structural conditions and external pressures, or whether the cognitive system of elites, as an independent variable, has played a determining role in these transformations.

To address this question, the study employs a theoretical framework combining four cognition-oriented theories: Axelrod’s cognitive maps, George’s operational codes, Miskimmon’s strategic narratives, and Sabatier’s advocacy coalitions. Adopting a qualitative approach and thematic analysis, including open, axial, and selective coding, the study reconstructs the cognitive systems of elites across the three periods and examines their correspondence with observable government behavior in the areas of regionalism and neighborhood policy.

The findings indicate that during the Ahmadinejad administration, the perception of the international environment as a hegemonic order contributed to the formation of a narrative centered on “independence and resistance” and an operational code emphasizing self-reliance. During the Rouhani administration, the perception of the costs of confrontation led to a narrative of “constructive engagement” and operational codes centered on negotiation and multilateralism. During the Raisi administration, the simultaneous perception of threats and opportunities resulted in a narrative of “independence accompanied by network-building” and a combination of operational codes focused on pressure neutralization and neighborhood policy.

Despite these differences, elements of continuity, including independence, security, and national interests, remained common across all three periods. The findings support all four hypotheses of the study, albeit with critical qualifications. In particular, they indicate that the boundaries between competing cognitive coalitions are more permeable in practice than is reflected in the overall synthesis, while the relationship between elite cognition and policy change demonstrates correlation rather than necessarily establishing causality.support all four hypotheses of the study, albeit with critical qualifications. In particular, they indicate that the boundaries between competing cognitive coalitions are more permeable in practice than is reflected in the overall synthesis, while the relationship between elite cognition and policy change demonstrates correlation rather than necessarily establishing causality.