Research Problem and Background
The Persian Gulf is one of the most sensitive geopolitical regions in the world, which has always been an arena for competition between regional and trans-regional powers. Meanwhile, the relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United Arab Emirates have always been characterized by a kind of interaction with tension due to their geographical location, energy resources, divergent political structures, and multi-layered security considerations. However, the 2026 war between the United States and the Israeli regime with Iran and the cessation of economic diplomacy and the sharp decline in bilateral trade between Iran and the UAE clearly showed that the economic interdependence of Tehran and Abu Dhabi is extremely fragile against military shocks.
Prior to these conflicts, the interactions between the two countries within the framework of macro approaches under “complementary geoeconomic cooperation” were based on the assumption that Iran, as an influential actor on the transit corridor and provider of energy security, and the UAE, as a financial and trade hub in the region, could move towards reducing tension and managing differences by complementing each other’s capacities. The tense developments of 2026 showed that economic-oriented approaches can collapse at high levels of tension and interference by external actors. On the one hand, the interventionist role of the United States and Israel in destroying economic cooperation between Iran and the UAE (through mechanisms such as joint security chambers, pressure on Dubai’s free zones, and the development of alternative corridors such as IMEC) is one of the key variables that has prevented the realization of complementary cooperation.
Also, the difference in perspectives within the UAE, especially the separation of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, is another important consideration. Abu Dhabi, as the political and security center of gravity of the UAE, has taken a more cautious and sometimes confrontational view of Iran, while Dubai, with its greater economic dependence on trade and transit with Iran, has always wanted to maintain economic channels and greater interaction. Despite the relative breadth of studies on Iran-UAE relations, most previous research can be divided into two categories: the first category, general and event-based analyses that lack a clear theoretical framework; the second category, research that, relying on defensive realism, has introduced the scenario of “complementary geoeconomic cooperation” as the desired model for relations between the two countries.
Research Objective
The present study, taking into account the interventionist role of the United States and Israel and the high level of military tension, has attempted to combine the theoretical framework of defensive realism with the theory of “fragility of interdependence” to examine the possibility of economic cooperation in crisis situations. Unlike most studies that have analyzed the relationship between Iran and the UAE mainly bilaterally, this study, by identifying the mechanisms affecting the interactions between Iran and the UAE, shows how trans-regional actors as disruptive variables deny the possibility of realizing complementary cooperation. Also, by emphasizing the behavioral duality of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, a one-dimensional view of the UAE is criticized and a realistic analysis is presented. Another innovation is that, unlike previous studies that have not paid attention to the role of institutions such as BRICS and OPEC+, this study examines their capacity in managing security-economic crises and reducing dependence on Western-oriented mechanisms.
Research Method
The present study is applied-analytical in terms of purpose and descriptive-analytical in nature, and uses a qualitative, content-oriented analysis to examine the strategic developments in Iran-UAE relations after the Forty-Day War. The reason for choosing a qualitative approach is that the research subject is concerned with the analysis of qualitative concepts that cannot be measured purely quantitatively and requires the interpretation of political, security, and economic contexts.
The research data were collected in a documentary-library manner and the data analysis was carried out through qualitative analysis of the main themes in three steps. In the first step (open coding), the initial concepts including the fragility of economic interdependence, the cessation of trade and economic diplomacy in the military shock, the interventionist role of the US and Israel, the separation of the Abu Dhabi and Dubai approaches, alternative corridors, multilateral institutions (BRICS, OPEC+, Shanghai Cooperation Organization), tense competitive coexistence, energy security and the Strait of Hormuz were identified and examined. In the second step (axial coding), the concepts were organized into four analytical clusters: “Fragility of economic interdependence”, “The interventionist role of transregional actors”, “The separation of the Abu Dhabi and Dubai approaches” and “Capacities and limitations of multilateral institutions”. In the third step (selective coding), five main themes were extracted.
Research Findings
The data analysis led to the extraction of three key themes:
First, the fragility of economic interdependence, which has been exacerbated by the interventionist role of the US and Israel through joint security chambers, pressure on Dubai’s free zones, and the development of an alternative IMAC corridor. The 2026 war showed that the high volume of trade and investment between the two countries not only does not prevent the escalation of tensions, but itself becomes the first victim of the crisis.
Second, the separation of the UAE’s domestic approaches (security-oriented Abu Dhabi versus economy-oriented Dubai) as a fundamental condition for any realistic analysis of the country’s behavior. The war revealed a deep divide between Abu Dhabi’s security-confrontational approach (influenced by the alliance with Israel) and Dubai’s economic-interactional approach (with a deep dependence on trade with Iran).
Third, the capacities and limitations of emerging multilateral institutions (BRICS, OPEC+, SCO) in managing security-economic crises. Despite their significant potential to reduce dependence on Western-oriented mechanisms, these institutions have not yet reached the necessary maturity in managing momentary military crises.
Conclusion
The recent war in the region, by revealing the realities resulting from military shock and revealing the consequences of the high level of tension in the Persian Gulf (especially the fragility of economic interdependence and the interventionist role of transregional actors), has provided the basis for the formation of a new situation called “tense competitive coexistence”.
The foundation of this model is based on limited, tense interaction based on mutual coercion. The requirement for strategic rearrangement of interactions arises from four main sources: (1) the fragility of economic interdependence; (2) the interventionist role of the US and the Israeli regime through joint security chambers, secondary sanctions, and the alternative IMAC corridor; (3) Abu Dhabi and Dubai’s strategic duality; (4) Reconsidering the role of multilateral institutions in military crisis management.
Although the interaction of internal factors (the strategic distinction between Abu Dhabi’s security-oriented approach and Dubai’s commercial-oriented approach) and external factors (the US and Israeli political-military tensions with Iran) has reduced the level of economic interactions between the two countries to a minimum, geoeconomic imperatives and neighborhood requirements are such that these interactions cannot be completely severed. The main reason for this is the existence of inevitable structural complementarities at two levels: on the one hand, access to Dubai’s extensive financial channels and infrastructure, which has become one of Iran’s non-oil export gateways over the decades; on the other, the security of the UAE’s energy supply chain, which is heavily dependent on de-escalation with Iran.
The economic diplomacy of Iran and the UAE is being redefined from a model of “mutually beneficial cooperation” to a new model called “tense competitive coexistence” that has four main characteristics: (1) economic interactions proceed under the shadow of military threat; (2) any cooperation is made sense by the logic of mutual coercion; (3) institutional trust has collapsed; (4) the inherent fragility of relations is such that small border or security incidents can disrupt the entire economic relationship. Emerging multilateral institutions such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, despite their significant potential, have not yet reached the necessary maturity in managing momentary military crises. However, these institutions can provide platforms for technical dialogue, regulate trade regulations resistant to secondary sanctions, and create credit lines independent of the Western financial system in the post-war period, and gradually play the role of “managed dependency management.” The main proposal of the research is to create a "controlled dependency management mechanism" including informal channels of expert dialogue centered on Oman's mediation and targeted use of the capacity of emerging institutions, which can gradually pave the way for prudent economic interactions and the weakening of tense policies.