Introduction
The West Asian region has been undergoing complex and extensive political and geopolitical changes over the past decades. The agreement between the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain with the Zionist regime in 2020, which was formed with the mediation of the United States and became known as the “Abraham Accords, once again challenged the order of this region. This agreement was a treaty to establish peace, establish diplomatic relations, and fully normalize relations between these countries, which were later joined by Sudan and Morocco. This was while Egypt and Jordan had also established relations with the Zionist regime in 1979 and 1994. After the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the end of the self-proclaimed ISIS government in Syria and Iraq, the strengthening of Hezbollah in Lebanon and resistance groups in Palestine, the possibility of an end to the war between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, the agreement reached between Iran and Saudi Arabia and, consequently, some of the countries on the Persian Gulf, the implementation of Operation Storm Al-Aqsa and the events that followed, as well as the possibility of an agreement between Iran and Egypt, the possibility of the collapse of the Sykes-Picot order has strengthened and once again pushes this region towards change and transformation. The main question of this research is: What will the future of the West Asian regional order be like after the conclusion of the Abraham Accords?
Methodology
This research is conducted using the futures research method based on Peter Schwartz's scenario writing. This method has various stages that are mentioned below and explained. First stage: Identifying the main topic of the scenario. Possible scenarios are scenarios that are more likely to be realized and occur. Accordingly, scenarios can be divided into five formats: 1- Continuation of the status quo (current situation) 2- Good future (improving the current situation) 3- Bad future (worsening the current situation) 4- Catastrophic future (unimaginably bad situation) 5- Miraculous future (unimaginably good situation). Second stage: Identifying key factors for each scenario and weighting them. Third stage: Identifying driving forces. Driving forces are issues that can affect key factors and make the speed of an event faster or slower than real time. Fourth stage: Determining the level of uncertainty of key factors. Determining the uncertainty of drivers and prioritizing key factors prevent an excessive number of scenarios. Step Five: Identifying and determining the logic of the scenario. For a scenario, an impact and effectiveness matrix of the driving forces should be prepared for the number of driving forces (all key factors). The extent of these impacts is divided into five states: very strong (4), strong (3), medium (2), weak (1), and ineffective (0). Step Six: Scenario Writing. And Step Seven: Reviewing and prioritizing scenarios.
Results
According to the survey data, the main driving forces affecting the security order in West Asia after the Abraham Accords are:
1. Security-military factors:
• The possibility of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons (81.4% of respondents assessed the possibility of changing the balance of power as “high” or “very high”).
• The security policies of the Zionist regime (65.7% of respondents assessed the possibility of changing the balance of power as “high” or “very high”).
• Operation Storm al-Aqsa and the assassination of key figures (47.3% probability of high impact).
2. Economic factors:
• Development of trade corridors such as AIMAC (33.3% probability of medium impact on Iran’s position)
• Economic cooperation between the Persian Gulf countries and Israel (59.8% probability of extensive cooperation).
3. Political-diplomatic factors:
• Political-diplomatic agreements between the Arab countries and Israel (66.7% probability of increasing Iran's isolation).
• Intervention by extra-regional powers (USA: 74.1% high impact, China and Russia: 46.7% medium impact).
Discussion
The analysis of the data obtained from the questionnaire and their processing based on the DEMATEL method shows that the emerging security order in the West Asian region has a networked and asymmetrical structure. In this structure, some factors are located in the central and driving range, while others are more in the position of consequential or affected factors. The first and most important analytical finding is the prominence of the role of the factor of strengthening military-security cooperation between the Zionist regime and the Arab states (F2). This factor, with the highest net impact and overall importance, is in first place in all DEMATEL indicators. The aforementioned characteristics introduce this factor as a factor that can strongly affect the balance of power, the pattern of alliances, and the security orientation of the countries in the region.
On the other hand, factors such as the development of joint trade-economic relations (F3) and the strengthening of the resistance front (F4) play a less direct role and are more subject to macro-security developments and the decisions of key players. The position of these factors in the lower part of the causal scatter diagram confirms their consequential and reactive nature.
It is noteworthy that some intermediate factors such as the creation of an anti-Iranian economic bloc (F5) and the formation of new political-diplomatic relations in the region (F6) have a net role close to zero but a high overall importance. This situation shows that these factors are both affected and have the ability to influence. Therefore, they can be considered structural intermediaries or two-way factors whose position can change depending on the strategic orientation of the countries.
Conclusion
Based on the available evidence and the findings of this study, the future of the security order in the West Asian region is not moving towards stability and convergence, but towards structural divergence, long-term de-insecurity, and intensified competition between powers in order to establish their desired order. The examination of the driving forces of crisis and patterns of power blocs in the Middle East region shows that the possibility of a fundamental change in the security order of this region and the transition to a new order is not realistic, at least in the short term. Among the conceivable scenarios, the most likely and realistic path forward is the continuation of the status quo.