Introduction
The West Asian region has been undergoing complex and extensive political and geopolitical changes over the past decades. The agreement between the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain with the Zionist regime in 2020, formed with the mediation of the United States and known as the “Abraham Accords,” once again challenged the regional order. This agreement aimed at establishing peace, diplomatic relations, and full normalization between these countries and was later joined by Sudan and Morocco. This occurred while Egypt and Jordan had already established relations with the Zionist regime in 1979 and 1994. Following the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, the end of the self-proclaimed ISIS territorial control in Syria and Iraq, the strengthening of Hezbollah in Lebanon and resistance groups in Palestine, the prospect of ending the war between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, the agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia and, subsequently, some Persian Gulf states, the implementation of Operation Al-Aqsa Storm and its aftermath, as well as the possibility of an agreement between Iran and Egypt, the likelihood of the collapse of the Sykes–Picot order has increased. These developments once again push the region toward transformation and structural change. The main research question is: What will the future of the West Asian regional order look like after the Abraham Accords?
Methodology
This research employs a futures studies approach based on Peter Schwartz’s scenario planning method. This method consists of several stages. The first stage involves identifying the focal issue and defining possible scenarios, which are categorized into five types: status quo continuation, optimistic future, pessimistic future, catastrophic future, and wildcard/miraculous future. The second stage focuses on identifying key factors and assigning weights to them. The third stage involves determining driving forces that influence these key factors. Driving forces are variables that can accelerate or decelerate developments. The fourth stage examines the level of uncertainty associated with key factors in order to avoid excessive scenario proliferation. The fifth stage involves constructing scenario logic through an impact–influence matrix, in which the intensity of influence is classified as very strong (4), strong (3), moderate (2), weak (1), and negligible (0). The sixth stage is scenario development, and the seventh stage involves scenario evaluation and prioritization.
Results
Based on the survey data, the main driving forces affecting the security order in West Asia after the Abraham Accords are categorized into security–military, economic, and political–diplomatic factors. In the security–military dimension, the possibility of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons was assessed by 81.4% of respondents as having a high or very high impact on the regional balance of power. The security policies of the Zionist regime were similarly evaluated as highly influential by 65.7% of respondents. Operation Al-Aqsa Storm and targeted assassinations were also identified as having a 47.3% probability of high impact. In the economic dimension, the development of trade corridors such as IMEC was identified as having a moderate impact (33.3%) on Iran’s position, while economic cooperation between Persian Gulf states and Israel was seen as highly probable (59.8%). In the political–diplomatic dimension, normalization between Arab states and Israel was associated with a 66.7% probability of increasing Iran’s regional isolation. Meanwhile, intervention by extra-regional powers was assessed as highly significant in the case of the United States (74.1%), while China and Russia were seen as having a moderate impact (46.7%).
Discussion
The analysis of the data using the DEMATEL method indicates that the emerging security order in West Asia has a networked and asymmetric structure. In this structure, certain factors function as driving forces, while others are mainly consequential or dependent variables.
The most significant finding is the central role of strengthened military–security cooperation between the Zionist regime and Arab states (F2). This factor, with the highest net influence and overall importance, occupies the leading position in all DEMATEL indicators and significantly affects the regional balance of power, alliance structures, and security orientations. In contrast, factors such as the development of trade–economic relations (F3) and the strengthening of the resistance axis (F4) play more indirect roles and are largely dependent on broader security developments and strategic decisions by key actors. Their position in the causal diagram confirms their reactive and consequential nature. Notably, intermediate variables such as the formation of an anti-Iran economic bloc (F5) and new political–diplomatic alignments (F6) exhibit near-zero net influence but high overall importance, indicating that they function as structural intermediaries with both influencing and influenced characteristics.
Conclusion
Based on the findings of this study, the future of the West Asian security order is not moving toward stability or convergence, but rather toward structural fragmentation, persistent insecurity, and intensified power competition over regional order-building. The analysis of driving forces and regional bloc patterns suggests that a fundamental transformation of the security order in West Asia is not realistic in the short term. Among the possible scenarios, the most likely trajectory is the continuation of the status quo.