Research Center for Principles and Models of Endemic Economy Diplomatic Interactions 3041-9395 3 12 2025 12 22 Austrian Science Diplomacy: Structure, Institutions, and Implementation Mechanisms in Foreign Policy Austrian Science Diplomacy: Structure, Institutions, and Implementation Mechanisms in Foreign Policy 250343 10.22034/dpiq.2026.593379.1099 FA Alireza Koohkan Associate Professor, Department of International Relations, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Allameh Tabataba'i University, Tehran, Iran 0000-0002-3594-4154 Journal Article 2025 07 23 Introduction In recent decades, science diplomacy has become one of the important foreign policy tools of countries to develop international cooperation, increase soft power, manage transnational challenges, and enhance their position in the international system. Developments such as the globalization of knowledge production, the expansion of cross-border scientific networks, the increasing role of emerging technologies, and the increasing complexity of global issues have caused science and technology to move from a purely specialized field to become an important component of national power and diplomatic interactions. Due to having a developed scientific system, active presence in international organizations, effective membership in the European Union and multilateralism, Austria is considered one of the notable examples of using scientific diplomacy among European countries. By creating links between foreign policy institutions, science and technology governance structures, universities, research centers and international scientific networks, this country has tried to use science and technology to serve its foreign policy goals and national interests. The main goal of this article is to examine the institutional structure, main actors, thematic priorities, and implementation mechanisms of Austrian science diplomacy and explain its role in achieving the country's foreign policy goals. Methodology The present study was conducted with a qualitative and explanatory method, using official documents of the Austrian government, reports of international organizations, and reliable scientific sources. The theoretical framework of the study is based on two-track diplomacy, and scientific diplomacy is examined as one of the most important forms of interaction between official diplomacy and non-governmental scientific networks. Results The findings of this study indicate that Austria’s science diplomacy is founded on a coherent system of science, technology, and innovation governance that employs policies, legislation, and specialized institutions to align scientific activities with national development and foreign policy objectives. Within this framework, science and technology are regarded not only as drivers of economic growth but also as instruments for strengthening soft power, enhancing international credibility, attracting human capital, and expanding global cooperation. Coordination among the government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, universities, research institutions, and the private sector constitutes one of the principal factors underlying the success of this approach. Discussion Austrian science diplomacy has distinct characteristics, defined priorities, and efficient institutions that strive to achieve defined goals through continuous action. The "Research, Technology and Innovation 2030" strategy, with its emphasis on scientific excellence, internationalization of research, development of human capital, participation in EU programs and strengthening research infrastructure, is the main pillar of the country's science policy. The "Excellence Initiative" also improves the quality of research by competitively supporting top research and international scientific networks. In addition, the "Research Financing Act" has provided the necessary financial stability for long-term programs and strengthened the integration of advisory institutions and evidence-based scientific policymaking. These components have enhanced Austria's position in scientific diplomacy and international cooperation. Austria's science diplomacy is based on a coordinated network of government, academic and research institutions that are responsible for policy-making, financing, implementing and developing international scientific cooperation. The Ministry for European and International Affairs, using embassies, strengthens the link between foreign policy and the country's scientific capacities, and the Ministry of Education, Science and Research is responsible for formulating science policies, internationalizing universities and coordinating research cooperation. The Austrian Academy of Sciences acts as an intermediary between the scientific community and the government by providing scientific advice and developing international knowledge networks. The Austrian Science Foundation and the Research Promotion Agency support basic and applied research and participation in European programs, respectively. The Education and Internationalization Agency also expands the global connections of researchers through scholarships and scientific exchanges. Finally, universities and research centers are the most important actors in implementing scientific diplomacy and strengthening Austria's global position by implementing joint projects, attracting foreign researchers, and participating in international scientific networks. Austria's science diplomacy focuses on strategic areas that are in line with national needs, scientific capabilities and international developments. Based on the "Research, Technology and Innovation 2030" strategy and EU policies, the four main priorities of this approach are: multilateralism and internationalization of science, green diplomacy, technology diplomacy and health diplomacy. Austria has strengthened its position in the global knowledge system by actively participating in European research programs, international scientific networks and cross-border cooperation. In the field of green diplomacy, the country uses scientific research to combat climate change, protect the environment, secure energy and achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. Technology diplomacy is based on the development of emerging technologies, strengthening university-industry cooperation and participating in the development of global rules for technologies such as artificial intelligence and cybersecurity. Also, health diplomacy, relying on medical universities, research centers, and international cooperation, enhances Austria's role in global health governance and tackling cross-border challenges. Austria’s science diplomacy, relying on efficient implementation mechanisms, has transformed scientific and foreign policy objectives into international cooperation. This model is based on the simultaneous participation of the government, universities, research centers, funding funds and scientific networks and is consistent with the “track two diplomacy” approach. One of the most important tools is the creation of domestic scientific networks for coordination between universities, research institutions and the innovation sector, as well as support for interdisciplinary research. Austria also contributes to knowledge production, technology transfer and the determination of international research priorities by actively participating in scientific networks in Europe and the world. Supporting scientific mobility, sending and attracting researchers and students, in addition to improving the quality of research, strengthens the country’s soft power and human capital. The country also plays an active role by participating in global science governance, especially in areas such as artificial intelligence, cybersecurity and climate change. Ultimately, the connection of science diplomacy with innovation and the knowledge-based economy has enhanced Austria's international standing and economic competitiveness. Conclusion The research findings show that the success of Austria's science diplomacy is the result of a coherent science and technology governance system, coordination between the foreign policy apparatus and scientific institutions, sustainable research funding, active participation of non-state actors, development of national and international scientific networks, and effective presence in European Union research programs. Also, Austria's experience shows that science diplomacy, in addition to enhancing the country's scientific and technological capacity, can help increase soft power, strengthen international credibility, attract human capital, and develop multilateral cooperation. Introduction In recent decades, science diplomacy has become one of the important foreign policy tools of countries to develop international cooperation, increase soft power, manage transnational challenges, and enhance their position in the international system. Developments such as the globalization of knowledge production, the expansion of cross-border scientific networks, the increasing role of emerging technologies, and the increasing complexity of global issues have caused science and technology to move from a purely specialized field to become an important component of national power and diplomatic interactions. Due to having a developed scientific system, active presence in international organizations, effective membership in the European Union and multilateralism, Austria is considered one of the notable examples of using scientific diplomacy among European countries. By creating links between foreign policy institutions, science and technology governance structures, universities, research centers and international scientific networks, this country has tried to use science and technology to serve its foreign policy goals and national interests. The main goal of this article is to examine the institutional structure, main actors, thematic priorities, and implementation mechanisms of Austrian science diplomacy and explain its role in achieving the country's foreign policy goals. Methodology The present study was conducted with a qualitative and explanatory method, using official documents of the Austrian government, reports of international organizations, and reliable scientific sources. The theoretical framework of the study is based on two-track diplomacy, and scientific diplomacy is examined as one of the most important forms of interaction between official diplomacy and non-governmental scientific networks. Results The findings of this study indicate that Austria’s science diplomacy is founded on a coherent system of science, technology, and innovation governance that employs policies, legislation, and specialized institutions to align scientific activities with national development and foreign policy objectives. Within this framework, science and technology are regarded not only as drivers of economic growth but also as instruments for strengthening soft power, enhancing international credibility, attracting human capital, and expanding global cooperation. Coordination among the government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, universities, research institutions, and the private sector constitutes one of the principal factors underlying the success of this approach. Discussion Austrian science diplomacy has distinct characteristics, defined priorities, and efficient institutions that strive to achieve defined goals through continuous action. The "Research, Technology and Innovation 2030" strategy, with its emphasis on scientific excellence, internationalization of research, development of human capital, participation in EU programs and strengthening research infrastructure, is the main pillar of the country's science policy. The "Excellence Initiative" also improves the quality of research by competitively supporting top research and international scientific networks. In addition, the "Research Financing Act" has provided the necessary financial stability for long-term programs and strengthened the integration of advisory institutions and evidence-based scientific policymaking. These components have enhanced Austria's position in scientific diplomacy and international cooperation. Austria's science diplomacy is based on a coordinated network of government, academic and research institutions that are responsible for policy-making, financing, implementing and developing international scientific cooperation. The Ministry for European and International Affairs, using embassies, strengthens the link between foreign policy and the country's scientific capacities, and the Ministry of Education, Science and Research is responsible for formulating science policies, internationalizing universities and coordinating research cooperation. The Austrian Academy of Sciences acts as an intermediary between the scientific community and the government by providing scientific advice and developing international knowledge networks. The Austrian Science Foundation and the Research Promotion Agency support basic and applied research and participation in European programs, respectively. The Education and Internationalization Agency also expands the global connections of researchers through scholarships and scientific exchanges. Finally, universities and research centers are the most important actors in implementing scientific diplomacy and strengthening Austria's global position by implementing joint projects, attracting foreign researchers, and participating in international scientific networks. Austria's science diplomacy focuses on strategic areas that are in line with national needs, scientific capabilities and international developments. Based on the "Research, Technology and Innovation 2030" strategy and EU policies, the four main priorities of this approach are: multilateralism and internationalization of science, green diplomacy, technology diplomacy and health diplomacy. Austria has strengthened its position in the global knowledge system by actively participating in European research programs, international scientific networks and cross-border cooperation. In the field of green diplomacy, the country uses scientific research to combat climate change, protect the environment, secure energy and achieve the Sustainable Development Goals. Technology diplomacy is based on the development of emerging technologies, strengthening university-industry cooperation and participating in the development of global rules for technologies such as artificial intelligence and cybersecurity. Also, health diplomacy, relying on medical universities, research centers, and international cooperation, enhances Austria's role in global health governance and tackling cross-border challenges. Austria’s science diplomacy, relying on efficient implementation mechanisms, has transformed scientific and foreign policy objectives into international cooperation. This model is based on the simultaneous participation of the government, universities, research centers, funding funds and scientific networks and is consistent with the “track two diplomacy” approach. One of the most important tools is the creation of domestic scientific networks for coordination between universities, research institutions and the innovation sector, as well as support for interdisciplinary research. Austria also contributes to knowledge production, technology transfer and the determination of international research priorities by actively participating in scientific networks in Europe and the world. Supporting scientific mobility, sending and attracting researchers and students, in addition to improving the quality of research, strengthens the country’s soft power and human capital. The country also plays an active role by participating in global science governance, especially in areas such as artificial intelligence, cybersecurity and climate change. Ultimately, the connection of science diplomacy with innovation and the knowledge-based economy has enhanced Austria's international standing and economic competitiveness. Conclusion The research findings show that the success of Austria's science diplomacy is the result of a coherent science and technology governance system, coordination between the foreign policy apparatus and scientific institutions, sustainable research funding, active participation of non-state actors, development of national and international scientific networks, and effective presence in European Union research programs. Also, Austria's experience shows that science diplomacy, in addition to enhancing the country's scientific and technological capacity, can help increase soft power, strengthen international credibility, attract human capital, and develop multilateral cooperation.

Research Center for Principles and Models of Endemic Economy Diplomatic Interactions 3041-9395 3 12 2025 12 22 A Study on India's Diplomacy Towards Israel During Narendra Modi's Era from the Perspective of Neoclassical Realism (2014-2025) A Study on India's Diplomacy Towards Israel During Narendra Modi's Era from the Perspective of Neoclassical Realism (2014-2025) 246618 10.22034/dpiq.2026.579750.1079 FA Heidarali Masoudi Assistant Professor, Department of Global and Regional Politics, Faculty of Economics and Political Sciences, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran. 0000-0003-3383-7926 Masoud Hamiani PhD, Department of Global and Regional Politics, Faculty of Economics and Political Sciences, Shahid Beheshti University, Tehran, Iran. 0009-0000-2886-2006 Journal Article 2025 08 29 Introduction Since the Narendra Modi-led government came to power in 2014, West Asia—viewed as India’s “extended neighborhood”—has gained strategic importance in New Delhi's quest to become an emerging international power. Unlike previous administrations, the Modi government has acted with unprecedented decisiveness in boosting political-diplomatic, economic, and security relations with Israel, moving beyond clandestine ties to an openly declared strategic partnership. This study seeks to explain this significant shift in Indian diplomacy. The central research question asks: why has Indian diplomacy towards Israel evolved from hidden connections to a transparent, strategic partnership during Narendra Modi’s premiership? The hypothesis posits that this transformation is primarily due to a change in Indian leaders' perception of international and regional threats and opportunities, particularly under Modi’s leadership. To test this, the study employs the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism, which uniquely bridges international systemic pressures and domestic intervening variables. Literature Review Existing scholarship on India-Israel relations, while valuable, exhibits several gaps. Works by Chinoy & Pradhan (2024) and Pant & Alhasan (2024) offer descriptive accounts of India’s West Asia policy but lack a deep theoretical explanation for the shift towards Israel. Authors like Blarel (2022) and Rajiv (2023) focus either narrowly on Modi’s personality or provide strategic recommendations without a causal analysis. Other studies, such as those by Inbar (2017) and Essa (2022), emphasize historical identity factors or ideological convergence between Hindu nationalism and Zionism, offering single-factor explanations. Kumaraswamy (2017) describes cooperative dimensions like agriculture but does not explain the underlying drivers of change. While Blarel (2017) highlights the role of non-state actors, no comprehensive, theory-driven research has systematically integrated both international structural pressures (e.g., the rise of China) and domestic factors (e.g., leadership beliefs, strategic culture, bureaucratic changes) to explain the transformation of India’s Israel policy under Modi. This study aims to fill this lacuna by applying neoclassical realism as a rigorous analytical framework. Methodology This research adopts a qualitative, theory-testing case study design. The deductive-hypothetical strategy derives the hypothesis from neoclassical realism. Data collection is based on documentary research, including primary sources (government statements, bilateral agreements) and secondary sources (academic articles, reports). The process-tracing technique, specifically the theory-testing variant, is employed as the primary analytical tool. Process tracing allows the study to identify the causal mechanism linking systemic pressures (independent variable) to the foreign policy outcome (dependent variable: strategic partnership with Israel) by examining domestic intervening variables. Following the “completeness standard” proposed by David Waldner, the analysis constructs a chronological causal chain (X → M1 → M2 → Y) to demonstrate causal sufficiency. The study specifically draws on the third variant of neoclassical realism, which emphasises four domestic intervening variables: leaders' images/perceptions, strategic culture, domestic institutions (bureaucracy and ruling party), and state-society relations (media, think tanks, interest groups). Results The findings confirm the hypothesis. The primary structural pressure driving India’s policy shift is the emergence of China as an international power pole. This systemic variable, however, is filtered through a compound causal mechanism comprising several domestic factors that facilitated the strategic partnership: (1) Leaders' Perceptions: Narendra Modi’s pragmatism, deal-making mentality, and personal friendship with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, including his use of “hugplomacy,” were crucial. (2) Strategic Culture: India’s strategic culture has redefined from Nehruvian idealism and economic pragmatism to a dominant “Hindu realist” approach under the BJP, which sees Israel as a natural partner. (3) Domestic Institutions: A change in bureaucratic mindset, particularly within the Ministry of External Affairs, moved away from a secular, balanced posture towards a pro-Israel orientation, exemplified by appointing Sushma Swaraj—a vocal supporter of Israel—as External Affairs Minister. The hegemonic BJP, unconstrained by Muslim vote-bank politics like the Congress party, actively pursued ties. (4) State-Society Relations: Media, think tanks (e.g., IDSA), and interest groups mobilized public and elite opinion, framing terrorism in a pro-Israel light and engaging in Track-II diplomacy. The process-tracing causal chain (Table 3 in the original) shows key events from China’s rise (2010) and the Arab uprisings (2011) to Modi’s 2017 visit to Israel, the 2021 I2U2 (West Asian Quad) formation, and the 2023 India-Middle East-Europe Corridor announcement. This chain reveals a compound mechanism where leaders’ perceptions act as a necessary condition, combining with other sufficient domestic conditions to produce the strategic partnership. Quantitatively, since 2014, 42.1% of Israel’s arms exports went to India, and bilateral trade (excluding military equipment) reached ~$10.77 billion (2022-23), up from $200 million in 1992. Discussion The strategic partnership is not merely a response to structural pressures or domestic factors alone but the product of their complex interaction. India’s shift towards Israel represents a multi-level balancing strategy against the rise of China. Externally, it serves as indirect balancing in the Indo-Pacific (using Israel as a gateway to the US and countering China’s “string of pearls” strategy) and institutional balancing through minilateral frameworks like the I2U2 in West Asia. Both nations also form a coalition against militant threats, framing their conflicts in Kashmir and the occupied territories as counter-terrorism. Internally, the partnership enhances India’s defence capabilities (internal balancing) through joint ventures (e.g., Adani-Elbit drones, Barak-8 missiles), contributing to India’s self-reliance (Aatmanirbhar Bharat) and strengthening the economy via technology transfer in agriculture, water management, and cybersecurity. The study concludes that Modi’s foreign policy towards Israel is best explained by neoclassical realism, demonstrating how systemic stimuli are translated into foreign policy outcomes through domestic filters. This research moves beyond descriptive or single-factor accounts, providing a comprehensive theoretical and empirical explanation. Future research should independently examine the impact of India’s domestic power distribution, Modi’s leadership style, and state-society relations on broader Indian diplomacy. Introduction Since the Narendra Modi-led government came to power in 2014, West Asia—viewed as India’s “extended neighborhood”—has gained strategic importance in New Delhi's quest to become an emerging international power. Unlike previous administrations, the Modi government has acted with unprecedented decisiveness in boosting political-diplomatic, economic, and security relations with Israel, moving beyond clandestine ties to an openly declared strategic partnership. This study seeks to explain this significant shift in Indian diplomacy. The central research question asks: why has Indian diplomacy towards Israel evolved from hidden connections to a transparent, strategic partnership during Narendra Modi’s premiership? The hypothesis posits that this transformation is primarily due to a change in Indian leaders' perception of international and regional threats and opportunities, particularly under Modi’s leadership. To test this, the study employs the theoretical framework of neoclassical realism, which uniquely bridges international systemic pressures and domestic intervening variables. Literature Review Existing scholarship on India-Israel relations, while valuable, exhibits several gaps. Works by Chinoy & Pradhan (2024) and Pant & Alhasan (2024) offer descriptive accounts of India’s West Asia policy but lack a deep theoretical explanation for the shift towards Israel. Authors like Blarel (2022) and Rajiv (2023) focus either narrowly on Modi’s personality or provide strategic recommendations without a causal analysis. Other studies, such as those by Inbar (2017) and Essa (2022), emphasize historical identity factors or ideological convergence between Hindu nationalism and Zionism, offering single-factor explanations. Kumaraswamy (2017) describes cooperative dimensions like agriculture but does not explain the underlying drivers of change. While Blarel (2017) highlights the role of non-state actors, no comprehensive, theory-driven research has systematically integrated both international structural pressures (e.g., the rise of China) and domestic factors (e.g., leadership beliefs, strategic culture, bureaucratic changes) to explain the transformation of India’s Israel policy under Modi. This study aims to fill this lacuna by applying neoclassical realism as a rigorous analytical framework. Methodology This research adopts a qualitative, theory-testing case study design. The deductive-hypothetical strategy derives the hypothesis from neoclassical realism. Data collection is based on documentary research, including primary sources (government statements, bilateral agreements) and secondary sources (academic articles, reports). The process-tracing technique, specifically the theory-testing variant, is employed as the primary analytical tool. Process tracing allows the study to identify the causal mechanism linking systemic pressures (independent variable) to the foreign policy outcome (dependent variable: strategic partnership with Israel) by examining domestic intervening variables. Following the “completeness standard” proposed by David Waldner, the analysis constructs a chronological causal chain (X → M1 → M2 → Y) to demonstrate causal sufficiency. The study specifically draws on the third variant of neoclassical realism, which emphasises four domestic intervening variables: leaders' images/perceptions, strategic culture, domestic institutions (bureaucracy and ruling party), and state-society relations (media, think tanks, interest groups). Results The findings confirm the hypothesis. The primary structural pressure driving India’s policy shift is the emergence of China as an international power pole. This systemic variable, however, is filtered through a compound causal mechanism comprising several domestic factors that facilitated the strategic partnership: (1) Leaders' Perceptions: Narendra Modi’s pragmatism, deal-making mentality, and personal friendship with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, including his use of “hugplomacy,” were crucial. (2) Strategic Culture: India’s strategic culture has redefined from Nehruvian idealism and economic pragmatism to a dominant “Hindu realist” approach under the BJP, which sees Israel as a natural partner. (3) Domestic Institutions: A change in bureaucratic mindset, particularly within the Ministry of External Affairs, moved away from a secular, balanced posture towards a pro-Israel orientation, exemplified by appointing Sushma Swaraj—a vocal supporter of Israel—as External Affairs Minister. The hegemonic BJP, unconstrained by Muslim vote-bank politics like the Congress party, actively pursued ties. (4) State-Society Relations: Media, think tanks (e.g., IDSA), and interest groups mobilized public and elite opinion, framing terrorism in a pro-Israel light and engaging in Track-II diplomacy. The process-tracing causal chain (Table 3 in the original) shows key events from China’s rise (2010) and the Arab uprisings (2011) to Modi’s 2017 visit to Israel, the 2021 I2U2 (West Asian Quad) formation, and the 2023 India-Middle East-Europe Corridor announcement. This chain reveals a compound mechanism where leaders’ perceptions act as a necessary condition, combining with other sufficient domestic conditions to produce the strategic partnership. Quantitatively, since 2014, 42.1% of Israel’s arms exports went to India, and bilateral trade (excluding military equipment) reached ~$10.77 billion (2022-23), up from $200 million in 1992. Discussion The strategic partnership is not merely a response to structural pressures or domestic factors alone but the product of their complex interaction. India’s shift towards Israel represents a multi-level balancing strategy against the rise of China. Externally, it serves as indirect balancing in the Indo-Pacific (using Israel as a gateway to the US and countering China’s “string of pearls” strategy) and institutional balancing through minilateral frameworks like the I2U2 in West Asia. Both nations also form a coalition against militant threats, framing their conflicts in Kashmir and the occupied territories as counter-terrorism. Internally, the partnership enhances India’s defence capabilities (internal balancing) through joint ventures (e.g., Adani-Elbit drones, Barak-8 missiles), contributing to India’s self-reliance (Aatmanirbhar Bharat) and strengthening the economy via technology transfer in agriculture, water management, and cybersecurity. The study concludes that Modi’s foreign policy towards Israel is best explained by neoclassical realism, demonstrating how systemic stimuli are translated into foreign policy outcomes through domestic filters. This research moves beyond descriptive or single-factor accounts, providing a comprehensive theoretical and empirical explanation. Future research should independently examine the impact of India’s domestic power distribution, Modi’s leadership style, and state-society relations on broader Indian diplomacy.

Research Center for Principles and Models of Endemic Economy Diplomatic Interactions 3041-9395 3 12 2025 12 22 An Institutionalist Analysis of the Influence of Iranian and American Think Tanks on Diplomacy and Foreign Policy An Institutionalist Analysis of the Influence of Iranian and American Think Tanks on Diplomacy and Foreign Policy 250341 10.22034/dpiq.2026.580227.1081 FA Ebrahim Shakouri PhD Student, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Allameh Tabataba’i University, Tehran, Iran. 0009-0002-0422-1014 Abbas Ali Rahbar Professor, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Allameh Tabataba’i University, Tehran, Iran. 0000-0003-4170-1316 Ebrahim Barzegar Professor, Department of Political Science, Faculty of Law and Political Science, Allameh Tabataba’i University, Tehran, Iran. 0000-0001-9250-4772 Journal Article 2025 05 02 Problem Statement and Background In recent decades, the growing complexity of international relations and the rise of non‑state actors have transformed diplomacy from a state‑centric enterprise into a multi‑layered process involving various knowledge‑producing institutions. Within this transformed diplomatic landscape, think tanks have emerged as significant intermediaries between specialized knowledge and policy decisions, particularly in foreign policy and diplomatic negotiations. While the literature acknowledges their growing influence on policymaking (Abelson, 2018; McGann, 2020), there remains a notable gap in comparative institutional analysis of how these organizations exert influence specifically on diplomatic processes and negotiations—often termed "Track II diplomacy" (Jones, 2015). This gap is especially pronounced when comparing Western and non‑Western contexts, where institutional arrangements differ fundamentally. Existing scholarship largely focuses on Western democracies, especially the United States, where think tanks like Brookings and Carnegie have long shaped foreign policy discourse and provided direct input to negotiating teams (Rich, 2004; Stone, 2007). However, far less attention has been paid to institutional conditions that enable or constrain think tank influence on diplomacy in non‑Western contexts, such as Iran. While a few studies have examined Iranian think tanks in terms of structure, funding, or general policy impact (Fattahi et al., 2019; Pour Ramezan & Mohammadi, 2025; Sadeghi Ghahroudi, 2024), none offers a systematic comparative analysis of how institutional arrangements affect their actual diplomatic influence. This study addresses that gap by asking: How do institutional differences between selected American and Iranian think tanks lead to divergent levels of influence on diplomatic processes and foreign policy outcomes? Specifically, it investigates why Brookings and Carnegie shape international negotiations and diplomatic agendas, while their Iranian counterparts—despite academic capacity or official status—remain largely peripheral to actual diplomatic decision‑making. The study is grounded in new institutionalism, which emphasizes formal rules, informal norms, and historical path dependence, and also draws on Track II diplomacy as a key mechanism for think tank influence. Research Objective The primary objective is to conduct a comparative institutionalist analysis of four think tanks—two American (Brookings and Carnegie) and two Iranian (Sharif Governance Think Tank and IPIS). The study aims to: (1) identify and compare institutional structures, funding mechanisms, and networking strategies; (2) assess levels of access to diplomatic processes and negotiation teams; (3) evaluate actual influence on diplomatic discourse, negotiation agendas, and foreign policy outcomes; and (4) explain institutional factors accounting for observed differences. Ultimately, it seeks actionable policy recommendations for enhancing Iranian think tanks' diplomatic influence, grounded in new institutionalism. The study also contributes to the broader literature on think tank influence by highlighting how institutional design shapes the capacity of these organizations to participate effectively in diplomatic processes. Research Methodology This study adopts a qualitative comparative case study design, drawing on new institutionalism—an approach emphasizing formal rules, informal norms, institutional structures, and historical path dependence in shaping political actors' behaviour (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Peters, 2012). This framework explains why similar organizations perform differently across institutional environments. The four think tanks were purposively selected based on three criteria: (a) relevance to foreign policy and diplomacy, (b) institutional diversity (independent to state‑embedded), and (c) sufficient documentary evidence. Data were collected through extensive document analysis of official reports, financial statements, organizational statutes, research outputs, and media appearances. Additionally, process tracing tracked specific instances of influence on diplomatic negotiations and policy decisions, using secondary sources and public records. The analysis was structured around three dimensions: (1) institutional structure and independence (financial autonomy, governance, staffing), (2) networking and access to diplomatic bodies, and (3) actual influence on diplomatic processes (direct, indirect, and discursive). This triangulation ensures reliability and allows for a nuanced understanding of how institutionalism can explain divergent patterns of diplomatic influence. Findings The findings reveal a stark contrast between the two national contexts. American think tanks (Brookings and Carnegie) exhibit high institutional independence, diverse sustainable funding, and extensive networking with the U.S. diplomatic corps. Brookings, founded in 1916, benefits from a large endowment (over US$466 million in 2025) and a well‑established "revolving door" whereby researchers frequently move between the think tank and senior diplomatic positions. This allows Brookings scholars direct participation in advisory meetings, informal dialogues, and working groups for international negotiations. Its research outputs—hundreds of reports annually—are routinely cited by U.S. negotiators and shape acceptable diplomatic discourse. Carnegie, established in 1910, adopts a transnational approach with regional offices worldwide. Its focus on strategic issues such as arms control and great power politics gives it a unique ability to shape global diplomatic norms and facilitate multilateral negotiations. Carnegie's experts are frequently invited to UN consultations and Track II dialogue sessions, contributing to pre‑negotiation frameworks. Both institutions exercise influence through direct policy advice, agenda‑setting, and normative framing—termed "discursive influence." Iranian think tanks (Sharif and IPIS) face significant constraints. Sharif enjoys relative academic independence and produces high‑quality research on governance, but lacks institutionalized communication channels with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its influence remains indirect and expert‑level, confined to occasional workshops and personal contacts, with no systematic mechanism for translating research into diplomatic products. IPIS, directly attached to the Ministry, has formal access to classified information and negotiating teams, giving it direct influence on intra‑organizational decision‑making. Yet its dependence on state bureaucracy limits analytical independence, originality, and capacity for constructive criticism. Its influence is largely supportive of official positions, and confidentiality prevents its outputs from contributing to broader diplomatic discourse. These findings demonstrate that institutionalism explains why think tanks with similar academic capacities have vastly different levels of diplomatic influence, highlighting a structural dilemma for Iran: Sharif has independence but no access, while IPIS has access but no independence. Conclusion The comparative analysis demonstrates that think tanks' diplomatic influence is shaped by three institutional factors: (1) organizational independence, (2) systematic access to diplomatic processes, and (3) effective participation in Track II diplomacy. American think tanks succeed by combining high independence with informal yet institutionalized access, enabling them to shape both negotiation content and broader intellectual frameworks. Iranian think tanks suffer from a structural dilemma—Sharif has independence but no access, while IPIS has access but no independence—and neither achieves the synergy required for substantial influence. The study concludes that without reforming institutional frameworks and creating intermediary links between think tanks and the diplomatic structure, expectations of increasing think tank influence on Iran's foreign policy are unrealistic. Based on the institutionalist perspective, four policy recommendations are offered: (1) enhancing independence through diverse sustainable funding; (2) establishing systematic channels for interaction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; (3) strengthening Track II diplomacy through informal dialogues; and (4) translating academic outputs into diplomatic products. These recommendations, rooted in new institutionalism, provide a roadmap for bridging the gap between knowledge production and diplomatic influence in Iran's foreign policy system, highlighting that institutional design is a critical variable in explaining cross‑national variation in think tank influence. Problem Statement and Background In recent decades, the growing complexity of international relations and the rise of non‑state actors have transformed diplomacy from a state‑centric enterprise into a multi‑layered process involving various knowledge‑producing institutions. Within this transformed diplomatic landscape, think tanks have emerged as significant intermediaries between specialized knowledge and policy decisions, particularly in foreign policy and diplomatic negotiations. While the literature acknowledges their growing influence on policymaking (Abelson, 2018; McGann, 2020), there remains a notable gap in comparative institutional analysis of how these organizations exert influence specifically on diplomatic processes and negotiations—often termed "Track II diplomacy" (Jones, 2015). This gap is especially pronounced when comparing Western and non‑Western contexts, where institutional arrangements differ fundamentally. Existing scholarship largely focuses on Western democracies, especially the United States, where think tanks like Brookings and Carnegie have long shaped foreign policy discourse and provided direct input to negotiating teams (Rich, 2004; Stone, 2007). However, far less attention has been paid to institutional conditions that enable or constrain think tank influence on diplomacy in non‑Western contexts, such as Iran. While a few studies have examined Iranian think tanks in terms of structure, funding, or general policy impact (Fattahi et al., 2019; Pour Ramezan & Mohammadi, 2025; Sadeghi Ghahroudi, 2024), none offers a systematic comparative analysis of how institutional arrangements affect their actual diplomatic influence. This study addresses that gap by asking: How do institutional differences between selected American and Iranian think tanks lead to divergent levels of influence on diplomatic processes and foreign policy outcomes? Specifically, it investigates why Brookings and Carnegie shape international negotiations and diplomatic agendas, while their Iranian counterparts—despite academic capacity or official status—remain largely peripheral to actual diplomatic decision‑making. The study is grounded in new institutionalism, which emphasizes formal rules, informal norms, and historical path dependence, and also draws on Track II diplomacy as a key mechanism for think tank influence. Research Objective The primary objective is to conduct a comparative institutionalist analysis of four think tanks—two American (Brookings and Carnegie) and two Iranian (Sharif Governance Think Tank and IPIS). The study aims to: (1) identify and compare institutional structures, funding mechanisms, and networking strategies; (2) assess levels of access to diplomatic processes and negotiation teams; (3) evaluate actual influence on diplomatic discourse, negotiation agendas, and foreign policy outcomes; and (4) explain institutional factors accounting for observed differences. Ultimately, it seeks actionable policy recommendations for enhancing Iranian think tanks' diplomatic influence, grounded in new institutionalism. The study also contributes to the broader literature on think tank influence by highlighting how institutional design shapes the capacity of these organizations to participate effectively in diplomatic processes. Research Methodology This study adopts a qualitative comparative case study design, drawing on new institutionalism—an approach emphasizing formal rules, informal norms, institutional structures, and historical path dependence in shaping political actors' behaviour (Hall & Taylor, 1996; Peters, 2012). This framework explains why similar organizations perform differently across institutional environments. The four think tanks were purposively selected based on three criteria: (a) relevance to foreign policy and diplomacy, (b) institutional diversity (independent to state‑embedded), and (c) sufficient documentary evidence. Data were collected through extensive document analysis of official reports, financial statements, organizational statutes, research outputs, and media appearances. Additionally, process tracing tracked specific instances of influence on diplomatic negotiations and policy decisions, using secondary sources and public records. The analysis was structured around three dimensions: (1) institutional structure and independence (financial autonomy, governance, staffing), (2) networking and access to diplomatic bodies, and (3) actual influence on diplomatic processes (direct, indirect, and discursive). This triangulation ensures reliability and allows for a nuanced understanding of how institutionalism can explain divergent patterns of diplomatic influence. Findings The findings reveal a stark contrast between the two national contexts. American think tanks (Brookings and Carnegie) exhibit high institutional independence, diverse sustainable funding, and extensive networking with the U.S. diplomatic corps. Brookings, founded in 1916, benefits from a large endowment (over US$466 million in 2025) and a well‑established "revolving door" whereby researchers frequently move between the think tank and senior diplomatic positions. This allows Brookings scholars direct participation in advisory meetings, informal dialogues, and working groups for international negotiations. Its research outputs—hundreds of reports annually—are routinely cited by U.S. negotiators and shape acceptable diplomatic discourse. Carnegie, established in 1910, adopts a transnational approach with regional offices worldwide. Its focus on strategic issues such as arms control and great power politics gives it a unique ability to shape global diplomatic norms and facilitate multilateral negotiations. Carnegie's experts are frequently invited to UN consultations and Track II dialogue sessions, contributing to pre‑negotiation frameworks. Both institutions exercise influence through direct policy advice, agenda‑setting, and normative framing—termed "discursive influence." Iranian think tanks (Sharif and IPIS) face significant constraints. Sharif enjoys relative academic independence and produces high‑quality research on governance, but lacks institutionalized communication channels with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its influence remains indirect and expert‑level, confined to occasional workshops and personal contacts, with no systematic mechanism for translating research into diplomatic products. IPIS, directly attached to the Ministry, has formal access to classified information and negotiating teams, giving it direct influence on intra‑organizational decision‑making. Yet its dependence on state bureaucracy limits analytical independence, originality, and capacity for constructive criticism. Its influence is largely supportive of official positions, and confidentiality prevents its outputs from contributing to broader diplomatic discourse. These findings demonstrate that institutionalism explains why think tanks with similar academic capacities have vastly different levels of diplomatic influence, highlighting a structural dilemma for Iran: Sharif has independence but no access, while IPIS has access but no independence. Conclusion The comparative analysis demonstrates that think tanks' diplomatic influence is shaped by three institutional factors: (1) organizational independence, (2) systematic access to diplomatic processes, and (3) effective participation in Track II diplomacy. American think tanks succeed by combining high independence with informal yet institutionalized access, enabling them to shape both negotiation content and broader intellectual frameworks. Iranian think tanks suffer from a structural dilemma—Sharif has independence but no access, while IPIS has access but no independence—and neither achieves the synergy required for substantial influence. The study concludes that without reforming institutional frameworks and creating intermediary links between think tanks and the diplomatic structure, expectations of increasing think tank influence on Iran's foreign policy are unrealistic. Based on the institutionalist perspective, four policy recommendations are offered: (1) enhancing independence through diverse sustainable funding; (2) establishing systematic channels for interaction with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; (3) strengthening Track II diplomacy through informal dialogues; and (4) translating academic outputs into diplomatic products. These recommendations, rooted in new institutionalism, provide a roadmap for bridging the gap between knowledge production and diplomatic influence in Iran's foreign policy system, highlighting that institutional design is a critical variable in explaining cross‑national variation in think tank influence.